This study applies a frontier benchmarking approach to measure economies of scope between the vertical stages of electricity supply in the U.S. electric industry. By comparing different frontiers for integrated and separate provision of electricity based on a bootstrapping DEA, two types of vertical unbundling are analysed. Separating the generation stage from networks and retail appears to be the most costly alternative with an average cost increase of 18 percent. Our second scenario, covering one of the options of transmission unbundling to be implemented in the European Union, shows an average cost increase below 2 percent.
Introduction
The liberalisation process in the electricity sector has been characterised by a large diversity of regulatory changes to promote fair competition and provide sufficient investment incentives in both generation and networks to ensure efficient and secure energy supply.
One of the controversial discussions is that of a vertical ownership unbundling and its alternatives to separate the competitive functions of the industry (generation and retail) from the monopolistic network stages (transmission and distribution) that aims to prevent discriminatory behaviour of network owners in favour of their own supply interests. The most noticeable discussion has taken place in the European Union, where three legislative packages enforced a movement over legal unbundling (including a functional and management separation) to ownership unbundling of transmission from the competitive supply stages to be implemented in the near future.
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The controversy about unbundling results from the highly interdependent supply stages in terms of coordination requirements and network externalities. Theory and empirical evidence indicate that investment and operative coordination may be handled more efficiently within integrated firms than between separate companies. Furthermore, risk economies play an important role, since independent suppliers rely on long-term contracts and wholesale markets to purchase their electricity supply needs.
The key concept behind the arguments against strict unbundling policies is that of vertical integration economies, or economies of scope. The central question is how much unbundling costs compared to its benefits for competition. This paper analyses the sources and magnitudes of vertical scope economies in electricity supply. Unlike most previous research that is based on cost function estimations, this study applies a frontier benchmarking approach to empirically analyse economies of scope between the vertical stages of electricity supply in the U.S. electric industry. By comparing different frontiers for integrated and separate provision of electricity based on a bootstrapping data envelopment analysis (DEA), two types of vertical unbundling are analysed, reflecting the fact that the precise location of the vertical split along the supply chain determines the resulting synergy losses.. Section two describes the sources of vertical synergies in the electricity supply industry and defines the unbundling options to be analysed in this study. In section three, the methodology of our benchmarking approach and the data base are described.
Section four provides a discussion of the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Vertical unbundling and scope economies

Sources of vertical synergies
Economies of scope exist if there is a cost advantage of integration in the sense that it is less costly to have two or more supply stages served by a single firm instead of separate firms. The electricity sector is a classical example, where those synergies have been confirmed both theoretically and empirically.
Formally, economies of scope are measured as the relative cost increase if two or more products are produced by separate firms in contrast to integrated production.
Following the general definition of Baumol et al. (1982) , economies of scope relative to a product T are
where C(Y) gives the costs of producing the complete output vector Y, while C (Y T ) and C(Y -T ) are the stand alone costs of separately producing T (i.e. Y T ) and all products except for T (i.e. Y -T ), respectively. Accordingly, scope economies exist, if the costs of separate production by specialised firms [C(Y T )+C(Y -T )] are higher than the costs of integrated production C(Y).
To this end, vertical scope economies measure the costs of separating the production along the vertical supply chain. Figure 1 illustrates the vertical stages of electricity supply and shows between which of them scope economies or diseconomies are likely to occur. Although being interrelated, three main groups of synergies may be distinguished, namely coordination economies, market risk economies (including hold-up risks), and specialisation economies.
Coordination economies occur due to the requirement of real-time balancing of supply and demand and with respect to network externalities (see Brunekreeft and Meyer, 2009 ). The main argument is that information flows can be handled more efficiently within vertically integrated companies than between separate firms. The latter may involve high market transaction costs as a result of both asymmetric information and differing incentives. 3 In particular, efficient investment coordination may be foiled by network externalities if generators do not take network expansion costs of their 3 Transaction costs can be interpreted as costs of using the market. For the theory of transaction costs see Williamson (1971 Williamson ( , 1975 Williamson ( , and 1979 and Hart (1995 As a third group of scope effects, it is claimed that there may also be negative synergies due to a specialisation advantage. The underlying argument is that a separation of supply stages may lead to efficiency gains due to a better management focus on specific tasks compared to a multi-product company. This argument was used both by the European Commission in its Sector Inquiry (see EC, 2007) and in the discussion about distribution unbundling in the Netherlands. 
Types of unbundling
As a consequence of the various relations between the electricity supply stages, the costs of unbundling depend on which of the vertical supply stages are separated. ( 2004) and Fraquelli et al. (2005) . These studies focus on distribution rather than transmission companies.
However, there are a couple of drawbacks of such cost function estimations. First, they assume that electric utilities produce their outputs under the same production and cost structure, no matter whether they are integrated or serve only parts of the supply stages. As Meyer (2010b) indicates, separate companies may behave differently compared to integrated ones and may realize specialisation advantages that compensate for the lack of vertical scope economies. Second, the underlying assumptions of a cost function estimation are that the observed companies are efficient and follow a cost minimizing approach. These assumptions may be violated in a network industry that is partly characterised by imperfect competition (generation stage) and regulated or state-owned monopolies (transmission and distribution stages).
Instead of the traditional cost function approach this study therefore uses frontier benchmarking to estimate vertical economies of scope.
Methodology and data
Data Envelopment Analysis
Frontier approaches are well suited for a comparison of companies that do not necessarily produce on the efficient frontier. The common characteristic of frontier benchmarking models is that the efficiency values are derived as a relative measure compared to the sample group. One of the most prominent benchmarking approaches for analysing regulated industries is data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is also used for regulatory purposes to derive efficiency performance targets. 6 The DEA method is a non-parametric approach that uses a linear programming technique to calculate the efficient frontier based on a sample of (comparable) firms. This is done by constructing a piece-wise surface over all observations. The advantage of DEA is unbundling (see EC, 2003) . Nevertheless, as our main focus is on generation and transmission, we do not expect a significant influence of this data limitation on our results.
that no functional assumption of the underlying production technology is required and it is possible to deal with the limited number of observations that are often the most serious restriction in analysing the energy sector. Due to the fact that no information on input and output prices is used, the analysis is restricted to measuring technicalinstead of economic -efficiency. Figure 3 illustrates the general DEA procedure graphically for one composite output (y) and one input (x), assuming variable returns to scale. 7 In figure 2 , the firms A, B, and C are considered efficient, since they require the least amount of inputs to produce their outputs among all observable firms. The so-called Shephard (1970) distance measure for D yields
A value of D θ =1.25, for instance, indicates that D is using 25 percent too much of its D , or 80 percent. For the efficient firms A, B, and C, technical efficiency is equal to 1. 
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The intuition behind the optimization approach is to find the maximum amount i θ by which firm i's input use can be radially contracted so that it still remains in the feasible input set defined by all other companies. This feasibility restriction is provided for by the constraints in equation (3) and can be interpreted as follows:
• The first constraint in equation (3) ensures that the firm's output vector y i cannot be larger than the linear combination of all other firms' outputs (i.e.
where is a N×1 vector of constant weights.
• The second constraint requires that the efficient input use of firm i after radial contraction, ( θ i x ), cannot be smaller than the linear combination of all other firms' inputs (i.e. X x i − ≥ θ ).
• Finally, the third constraint ensures that the vector of weights is positive.
The meaning of the vector is that it provides a linear combination of all observed inputs and outputs that produces a projected point (X ,Y ) on the efficiency frontier (see Coelli et al., 2005) which corresponds to the efficient production of firm i after its input use has been corrected for inefficiency by radial contraction. For the example of firm D mentioned above, this projection on the frontier is given by point D' as shown in figure 2. As part of the DEA, this linear optimisation procedure is repeated N times for all firms in the sample.
Although DEA is commonly used not only in academics but also in practice 9 , it has some well-known shortcomings. A major disadvantage of DEA is that it is not a statistical method and, hence, no account is taken of data noise such as measurement errors. Due to the fact that all deviations from the calculated frontier are attributed to inefficiency, the DEA approach is sensitive to data outliers.
Measuring economies of scope
Measuring economies of scope based on frontier methods involves the comparison of different frontiers, namely for integrated and separate production of an output vector.
Assume we have two output vectors y 1 and y 2 which can be produced either by one integrated company supplying (y 1, y 2 ) or by two separate companies supplying (y 1, 0) and (0, y 2 ), respectively. Accordingly, there are economies of scope if the costs of integrated production, given by C(y 1, y 2 ), are less than the costs of separate production,
given by C(y 1, 0) + C(0, y 2 ). However, an application of benchmarking to evaluate this kind of comparison requires two samples of firms producing the same output vector. A basic methodology for such a frontier comparison was introduced by Färe (1986) . If all separate companies are combined pairwise, by adding up their output and inputs, one constructs a new sample of hypothetically integrated companies. These companies produce the same output vectors as the integrated ones, but do so under a different, namely separate, production technology. Figure 4 illustrates the procedure of a frontier comparison.
Assume firms A, B, C, and D are real integrated companies whose "integrated frontier" is denoted as L(y1,y2). Firms E and F are hypothetical combinations of separate companies whose "separate frontier" shall be denoted as L(y1,0) + L(0,y2).
We see directly from figure 4 that the separate frontier lies outside of the integrated one, which means that producing the same amount of outputs requires more inputs under separate compared to integrated production. The degree of scope economies (for any given output) results from the relative radial distance of both frontiers. The formal procedure involves the following two steps: Hence, scope economies with regard to products y 1 and y 2 can be calculated as the ratio of efficiency scores (ER), which for the example of firm D is given by
As can be seen from figure 4, this efficiency ratio is equivalent to the radial distance between the separate and the integrated frontier. Note that the individual inefficiencies of all firms cancel out, as we are only interested in technological inefficiency resulting from the separation of the production process or, in other words, economies of scope.
This approach has been applied to the estimation of scope economies in various contexts (see e.g. Grosskopf and Yaisawarng, 1990 ). Growitsch and Wetzel (2006) provide an application to a typical network industry, and analyze scope economies in European Railways using a bootstrapping procedure. To the best of the author's knowledge only Arocena (2008) uses the methodology to analyse the electricity industry, finding evidence for vertical synergies for Spanish distribution utilities.
Database and procedure
Our data stem from FERC form 1 for U.S. electric utilities for the period of 2001 to 2008 containing both separate and integrated electric companies. Table 1 gives a summary statistic of the database separately for each group of company according to the output stages at which they are active. The groups are named by their scope of the company's outputs so that GTD stands for a fully integrated utility with generation (G), transmission (T) and distribution (D) output, while G, for instance, refers to a sole generators without network and retail business. We use TOTEX as the only input variable and four output variables, generation (G),
transmission (T), distribution (D) and transmission network length (NL). We apply a variable returns to scale (VRS) model.
Due to the data sensitivity of the DEA, we eliminate outliers separately for each company group, using the influence-function approach developed by Wilson (1993) .
In the following we apply the frontier comparison approach described above to measure vertical economies of scope with regard to two options of vertical unbundling, as defined in section 2.2. Accordingly, there are three frontiers to compare, one integrated and two additive frontiers. The latter two reference samples need to be constructed by pairwise combining the separate companies to hypothetically additive firms according to the underlying unbundling options:
11 The price of proprietary capital is the sum dividends for common and preferred stock and retained earnings divided by proprietary capital. The price of long-term debt is the interest on long-term debt divided by long-term debt outstanding. The calculation of capital prices is based on Kolbe and Read (1986) . named as G, with integrated transmission and distribution companies, TD, by pairwise adding up outputs and costs. We refer to this constructed additive sample as G+TD.
• Transmission unbundling (TU) . Similarly, we obtain a reference set containing of transmission companies (T) and integrated generation-distribution firms (GD). We will refer to this additive sample as GD+T.
Following Growitsch and Wetzel (2006) , we apply a bootstrapping procedure as developed by Efron (1979) in order to obtain statistical features of the estimated results. The idea is to create a number of bootstrap samples by applying a number of random draws with replacement from the original sample. We used the common value of B=1000 draws. By repeatedly performing DEA to these samples, a set of efficiency estimates 1 i θ ,…, iB θ for each firm i is calculated that can be used to provide information on the statistical properties of the DEA efficiency measures. The assumption is that each of the randomly drawn bootstrap samples is representative for the underlying population. Following Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000) , a smoothed bootstrap method is used to overcome the problem of biased estimates resulting from the discontinuous distribution of efficiency scores, in particular for small samples.
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Results
Scope economies are estimated by applying the bootstrap benchmarking procedure to the integrated firms both with respect to their own sample and the reference samples for the two unbundling cases. The measure for scope economies results from the ratio of efficiency scores. Table 2 summarises the estimation results for both unbundling scenarios, while a deeper analysis of scope economies follows below. We observe that on average, generation unbundling (GU) leads to a permanent cost increase of 17.9 percent, while transmission unbundling (TU) results in a synergy loss around 1.4 percent. 
a) Generation unbundling
Generation unbundling (GU) refers to a separation of generation from both network stages and retail. Hence, scope estimates result from comparing the additive frontier firms (G+TD) with the integrated utilities (GTD). As table 2 reveals, the average value of scope economies (ER GU ) appears to be almost 18 percent, which makes the GU option the most costly form of vertical unbundling.
However, a detailed analysis of the individual efficiency ratios shows that scope economies vary in a broad range depending on the output structures. Table 3 14 Note that both the number of observations and the summary statistics differ from the original sample values for integrated firms given in table 1. This is a result of the variable returns to scale assumption, which reduces the number of comparable firms due to differences in size between integrated and separate firms. As a consequence, the average firm size of the remaining integrated utilities reduces compared to the full sample.
IF: integrated firms (GTD) ER: efficiency ratios (scope economies) Strong synergy losses mainly occur for small utilities (with respective outputs below 5 million MWh), in particular those having a relatively small distribution output, as the output ratio VI T/D (>2) indicates. Obviously, it is (c.p.) more costly for small distributors to divest their generation assets than it is for utilities with a stronger supply focus. Accordingly, the risk effect seems to affect these companies stronger. In the TU scenario, the transmission stage is separated from all other supply stages.
Hence, scope effects are measured based on a comparison of the additive sample (GD+T) with the integrated sample (GTD). According to both theoretical and empirical findings, this unbundling option is expected to lead to coordination losses between generation and transmission, while risk compensation between generation and retail through vertical integration is still possible. The average synergy losses of transmission unbundling are about 1.4 percent.
Accordingly, coordination economies appear to be of smaller importance compared to the risk effects resulting from the GU option analysed above.
The detailed results are given in table 4. The distribution of scope economies among the sample utilities is similar to the GU scenario. Synergy effects tend to be stronger for companies with a low generation and distribution output compared to transmission, as the output ratios VI G/T (<0.5) and VI T/D (>2) indicate. Note that this relationship refers to transmission output and not the size of the transmission network. For the GU scenario, vertical synergies lie between 16 and 22 percent, which is comparable to our benchmarking estimation of 18 percent on average. It should be noted, however, that the size effect in the studies of Kaserman and Mayo (1991) and Kwoka (2002) is different both to this study and the cost function estimation (based on the same database) of Meyer (2010a) . Instead, scope economies appear to increase with firm size in these studies.
For the TU option, Meyer (2010a) is the only comparable estimation. As table 5 shows, vertical synergies range between 5 and 9 percent, compared to an average value of 1.4 percent according to the DEA approach.
It should be noted, however, that the underlying approaches are fundamentally different. The main advantage of the cost function estimation is that it is theoretically more precise, and it is able to control for a number of environmental factors and input prices, while our benchmarking approach is restricted to the main output variables to minimise the loss of explanatory power. On the other hand, it may be seen a disadvantage of the cost function approach to assume a specific functional form of the underlying cost structure. In particular, the cost function is assumed to be the same for all companies, no matter on which of the supply stages they are active. One could argue, however, that separate companies may realise specialisation economies by focusing on their respective tasks. A cost function estimation would average these cost differences over all firms, while it is the strength of the benchmarking procedure to directly compare separate and integrated companies to compare its cost structures. This study applies a frontier benchmarking approach to empirically analyse economies of scope between the vertical stages of electricity supply in the U.S. electric industry.
Unlike most previous studies, this analysis allows for directly comparing different frontiers for integrated and separate provision of electricity based on data envelopment analysis (DEA).
Two unbundling options are analysed. Generation unbundling (GU) refers to a separation of the generation stage from transmission and distribution. This appears to be the most costly alternative with an average cost increase of 17.9 percent. The main part of vertical synergies is expected to arise from risk economies due to the separation of generation from distribution, which includes retail. The reason is that market risk of electricity supply increases, since retailers are subject to volatility of market prices if they have to purchase their supply needs from the wholesale markets instead of selfgeneration.
The second scenario, transmission unbundling (TU), analyses a separation between transmission and all other supply stages, which is one of the options of the European Union's third legislative package. This type of unbundling shows an average cost increase of 1.4 percent, which is mainly due to coordination losses between the transmission and generation stages.
For both scenarios synergy losses are higher for companies with a relatively strong focus on transmission compared to generation and distribution (measured by the respective output ratios).
For the average company size, both scenario results are comparable to previous cost function studies, although the size effects are partly reversed for generation unbundling. In case of transmission unbundling, synergies appear to be smaller compared to the costs function estimation based partly on the same data base. A reason may be that the direct comparison of separate and integrated companies may reveal differences in the cost structure which are ruled out by assumption when estimating a single multi-stage cost function for all utilities.
